



RIPE NCC

RIPE NETWORK COORDINATION CENTRE

NIS 2

Why we should be concerned
and what we can do about it

Suzanne Taylor | 23 November 2021 | RIPE 83

Let's recap...



- **NIS (2018)**
 - Aim was to boost cybersecurity across the EU
 - Applies to “digital service providers” and “operators of essential services”
 - Member states defined their own “operators of essential services”
 - RIPE NCC not included by Dutch government
- **NIS 2 (2020)**
 - Aim to harmonise across member states
 - ~~Operators of essential services~~ > **essential entities**
 - ~~Digital service providers~~ > **important entities**

Who's who?



- **Essential** entities

- Root name servers
- Authoritative name servers
- Recursive resolvers
- IXPs
- TLD registries
- TLD name servers
- Cloud computing services
- Data centres
- CDNs
- Trust providers

- **Important** entities

- Online marketplaces
- Search engines
- Social networking platforms

Main points



- Essential entities:
 - Security requirements
 - Compliance checks
 - Incident reporting
 - EU representative
- Larger role for ENISA
- Management/boards held personally liable for non-compliance
 - And fines of up to 2% annual turnover/€10M

What's the problem?



- Unintended consequences and **overreach**
 - Regulating non-EU root name server operators
 - Encourages other governments to reciprocate
- Reducing **resiliency**
 - Root name server operators in the EU might be dissuaded
 - Opposite effect from the goal
- Goes against **multistakeholder** approach
 - Counters IANA stewardship transition




Other concerns



- Contained in the proposal:
 - Mandatory **identification checks** when registering domain names
 - All top-level domain registries serving EU citizens
- Why this is bad:
 - Unreasonable burden on registries > higher costs
 - Limits ability to compete in a global market
 - How to enforce compliance?

EU legislative process



What we've done



- Responded to consultation
 - Asked to exclude root name servers
- Engaged with relevant MEPs
- Success (with the Parliament!)
 - Committee in charge excluded root name servers

Parliament's reasoning



*Root name servers should be out of scope; regulating them is contrary to the EU's vision of a “**single, open, neutral, free, secure and un-fragmented network**” and could encourage and empower states advocating for a top-down, state-controlled Internet governance approach, instead of the multi-stakeholder approach.*

What's happening now



- Now we turn to the Council
 - Council may propose including only root name server operators with more than 10 sites in the EU
 - We're engaging with Dutch government and several others
 - Council expected to vote soon

What you can do



- Learn more
 - Article 2 / Annex I (scope and providers)
 - Article 4 (definitions of providers)
 - Article 23 (TLD registries)
 - Article 24 (member state jurisdiction)
 - Recital 65 (extraterritorial scope)
- Talk to your government contacts
 - Need as much support from 27 EU member states as possible
 - Explain problems and make sure implications are understood
- Let's keep sharing information





Questions



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